Explaining Creativity by Kronfeldner, Maria
  
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining creativity 
 
Maria Kronfeldner 
 
 
  Penultimate draft, with pages as in published version.    2017 
See published version for final version.  
 
Forthcoming In B. Gaut and M. Kieran (ed.). Routledge Handbook  
on Creativity and Philosophy, pp. 213-229. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a long tradition in the history of philosophy, art or science that 
regards creativity as extraordinary and in that sense exceptional. Looked at 
closely, the exceptionalist attitude comes in two varieties: creativity as 
realized by exceptional people or by exceptional cognitive processes. It is 
often combined with a second attitude, namely that creativity is a mystery 
that cannot be explained. It is inexplicable from a naturalistic point of view. 
Because of the latter, creativity is often regarded as the ‘last frontier’ of a 
science of the mind. Consequently, computers are denied the potential to 
be creative; computers might exhibit cognition, but they are not creative, 
or so the argument goes. The first attitude assumes (what I call) an 
exceptionalist concept of creativity and the second (what I call) an obscurantist 
concept of creativity. These two attitudes towards creativity are distinct 
but historically connected. 
In this paper, I will directly criticize only the obscurantist concept of 
creativity. The results, however, shall cast doubt on the exceptionalist con- 
cept too. I will defend two claims to demystify creativity: (1) the claim 
that creativity cannot be explained at all wrongly identifies creativity with 
what I shall call metaphysical freedom (i.e., libertarian freedom presuppos- 
ing the falsity of determinism); (2) the Darwinian approach to creativity, 
a prominent naturalistic account of creativity, fails to give an explanation 
of creativity because it confuses description (and the concept of creativity 
which rests on it) with giving an explanation of the respective phenom- 
enon. I will close with some remarks about the philosophical status of and 
differences in explanations available in contemporary cognitive science.1 
 
 
Originality and spontaneity as the core 
aspects of creativity 
 
The phenomenon of creativity is characterized by originality and spontane- 
ity. Originality points to the conceptual assumption that creativity requires 
that something new is produced. As I argued elsewhere (Kronfeldner 2009, 
2011), the kind of novelty that is required – in what is usually meant by 
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the term ‘creativity’ – is of a specific kind, neither anthropological nor 
historical. If you just create a new bit of culture – something humans qua 
humans (and some animals) do all the time – then you create something 
new in an anthropological and numerical sense, but you are not creative in 
the narrow sense of the term. For instance, if you create a new token pot 
of the kind typical of the culture you participate in, then you are not crea- 
tive, since you learned to make it the way you do it. You follow a routine. 
Learning and following a routine is usually conceptually contrasted with 
creativity.2  Not all making or fabricating, as Gaut (this volume) calls it, is 
creative in the narrow sense. 
The same conceptual contrast helps explicating why you can be crea- 
tive even if you are historically not the first one doing what you are doing. 
Historical novelty, as Boden (2004: 43–48) stressed, is not required for 
creativity in the narrow sense targeted here. What is most interesting from 
my point of view, as stressed in Kronfeldner (2009), is however not the 
distinction as such (between historical novelty and what is now called, fol- 
lowing Boden, ‘psychological novelty’), but the reason why historical novelty is 
not important for explaining creativity in the narrow sense, even though it is his- 
torical novelty that fills the annals of hero-worshipping in science, philos- 
ophy or art and creativity ‘in the wild’, as some might say. The reason lies 
in the asymmetry involved, which shows that psychological novelty is more 
fundamental. The asymmetry is the following: even though every histori- 
cal novelty must have been a psychological novelty (it entails it, as Gaut in 
this volume writes), the converse does not hold, since an insight can be 
psychologically new without being historically new. The asymmetry arises 
from connecting – and that is the crucial point behind the asymmetry – the 
novelty criterion back to causal processes and thus to relations; historical 
novelty points to the existence of an original, but it is not the existence of 
an original that is important for the question of whether an act of pro- 
duction exhibits originality at the psychological level. What is important 
for that question is rather the kind of process connecting what already 
exists to what one produces; whether there is a causal connection between the 
alleged ‘original’ and the alleged ‘copy.’ Creativity is compromised only if 
you copied the original (in whatever sense, via social or individual learn- 
ing, etc.), i.e., if there is a causal link between the original and what you 
make. Certainly, in order to have one’s own creativity compromised by an 
original, there needs to be a historical original, but the fact that there is an 
original is not sufficient to be compromising. Originality is pointing to a 
relation, independence of an individual from the rest of the world, and 
not to occurrences of novelty (as an intrinsic property of the products of 
creative minds).3 
Spontaneity points to the phenomenological datum that the individual, 
if creative, has no control over the creative process. Terms like ‘insight,’ 
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‘inspiration,’ ‘surprise,’ and ‘eureka!’ point to this aspect. You can raise 
your arm by the power of your will, but you cannot come up with an idea 
for a problem that demands a creative solution simply by the command 
of your will. If you invented your own technique of how to make pots 
and you make a (numerically) new pot using this technique, you are not 
per- forming a creative act in the narrow sense assumed here, since you 
simply follow a routine, even if it is your very own routine. At that mo-
ment, you might be original, but not creative in the narrow sense. There is 
abundant evidence – from the annals of history as well as from experi-
mental studies of psychologists – that creativity in the narrow sense 
involves a kind of spontaneity (what psychologists call instantaneous 
insight) that amounts to a loss of control over the process of creativity. 
Insight or spontaneity, whichever term we prefer, can thus count as a 
phenomenological datum of creativity research, part of what it is like to be 
creative. It is thus part of the description of creativity. Consequently, 
spontaneity has been used as a second conceptual criterion for creativity in 
the narrow sense. After all, an adequate concept of creativity certainly 
depends on how we describe the occurrences thereof. 
Yet, that creativity is characterized by spontaneity does not mean that 
there is no goal-directedness involved. Even though creativity can hap- 
pen without any goal (i.e., a problem to solve in mind), as in cases of 
so-called true serendipity, there are also cases of so-called pseudo- 
serendipity and cases of true creative trial-and-error problem-solving. In 
cases of true serendipity, one is not looking for a solution to a problem. 
One only recognizes something as a solution to a problem, i.e., one takes 
something to be a problem to be solved at the moment one sees the 
solution to it. In cases of pseudo-serendipity, there is a perceived prob- 
lem, but there is no active search for a solution, e.g., by producing trials. 
One does not produce a trial in pseudo-serendipity; one simply comes 
across a solution while looking for it. Only in cases of trial-and-error are 
you intentionally producing trials, even though this goal-orientedness is 
not sufficient for finding the solution, since there are cases of trial-and- 
error that are truly creative, i.e., involving originality and spontaneity. 
Spontaneity thus amounts to the absence of foresight and the absence of 
control over the process of generating a solution to a goal and not to a 
denial of goal-orientedness.4 
To summarize the results so far: creativity is opposed to routine produc- 
tion and technique in this sense (i.e., method). It involves originality and 
spontaneity. Both criteria, i.e., originality and spontaneity, can be fulfilled 
in degrees. Therefore, creativity comes in degrees too. This is of utmost 
importance, since I will show that the kind of independence (i.e., the 
kind of freedom) that originality and spontaneity incorporate is only a 
partial one. 
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The obscurantist and exceptionalist tradition 
 
Plato (most prominently in the Ion, but also in the Phaidros and the Menon) 
already recognized that creativity is characterized by the two aspects origi- 
nality and spontaneity. Yet, it is mainly because of spontaneity that Plato 
regarded it as extraordinary; only a few (for instance Homer but no other 
poets) exhibit it, according to him. The few who are creative are endowed 
with supra-natural powers, kissed by the muses, literally ‘out of their mind’, 
while others just produce novelty with knowledge and routine method (see 
Ion, 532c–534d). This is the origin, not just of connecting creativity to 
madness, but also of the more general exceptionalist and obscurantist atti- 
tudes towards creativity, which is sometimes also called ‘romantic’. 
Along such lines, Kant (in his Critique of Judgment) excluded scientists as 
well as philosophers from being truly creative. They are merely great heads 
(große Köpfe) and not geniuses, i.e., the only ones who are truly creative. 
The difference between them is not a difference in degree of excellence 
but a difference in kind; one is creative and the other is very intelligent. 
For Kant, the difference stems from the fact that geniuses create with the 
help of imagination and cannot tell how they do it. By contrast, scien- 
tists (like Newton) can, according to Kant, tell how they arrive at new 
insights. They have and use methods. Anybody can in principle learn these 
methods, which is why creativity (being a genius) is so exceptional and 
obscurantist for Kant. Kant’s account is certainly different from Plato’s but 
both assume that creativity is extraordinary and constitutes a case of inex- 
plicable cognition. The tradition of such exceptionalist and obscurantist 
attitudes towards creativity is long and, if looked at closely, complicated 
– involving lots of variations of the same basic obscurantist cum excep- 
tionalist schema.5 
 
 
A strategy to criticize the obscurantist cum 
exceptionalist schema 
 
I will criticize this obscurantist cum exceptionalist schema from a sys- 
tematic point of view, by picking out some recurring threads. The first 
thread is the claim that originality and spontaneity involve an opposition 
to causal determination, the second thread is the claim that producing 
real novelty amounts to a certain kind of blindness and the third thread 
is the claim that spontaneity points to a special, extraordinary cognitive 
process. The first claim, if successful, makes explaining creativity (what- 
ever kind of explanation offered) impossible, while the second and third 
claim exclude, if successful, certain kinds of explanation. The second 
does so via a conceptual argument, while the third does it via an actual 
empirical, explanatory claim. 
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What I assume in the following is that, from an analytic point of view, 
originality and spontaneity can both be regarded as two kinds of partial 
independence: 
 
      (a) Originality amounts to partial independence from the causal influ- 
ence of an original (direct or via a human person from whom one 
learns how to produce an item). The assumed contrast is with learning 
and copying. 
      (b) Spontaneity amounts to partial independence from the causal 
influence of previously acquired knowledge. The assumed contrast is 
with method and routine. 
 
The qualifier ‘partial’ is very important, since there is nothing in the con- 
cept of creativity that prevents us from taking into account that those 
who are creative use what they learned and usually stand on the proverbial 
‘shoulders of giants.’ Creativity transcends the already acquired knowl- 
edge of others (originality) and of the individual whose creativity is at 
issue (spontaneity), but at the same time it builds on this already acquired 
knowledge of others and of the creative individual, and is thus partially 
constrained by it.6 
 
 
Creativity as defying any naturalistic explanation 
 
In accordance with what I assume above, Carl R. Hausman (1984: ix, 9-
18) writes that “genuine novelty” must be “unpredicted […] unaccounted 
for by antecedents and available knowledge, and is thus disconnected with 
the past.” Yet, he combines this with a contrast to causal determination as 
such and writes the following: “A causal view of explanation sets a 
framework for ways of denying that there is anything new under the sun.” 
According to this view, if determinism is true, there cannot be anything 
genuinely new and, consequently, no genuine creativity. Whatever novelty 
there is, it can be reduced to and derived from what was previously avail- 
able. An imagined demon (or ‘God’) could have known it all along, so it 
wouldn’t be genuinely new. To be genuinely new, the novelty needs to tran- 
scend causal determination, it must be created ex nihilo. Such a perspective 
assumes that causal determination conflicts with creativity. There must be 
an independence from causal influences, a metaphysical freedom, involved 
in order to speak of genuine creativity. ‘Being creative’ is equated with 
‘being free’ (in the metaphysical sense) and creativity is regarded as natu- 
ralistically inexplicable. 
In principle, there are three possible replies to such an inexplicabil- 
ity claim: one could point to non-naturalistic kinds of explanations, or 
one could point to in-deterministic causation as sufficient for explaining 
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creativity. Finally, one could resolve the alleged conflict between naturalistic 
explanation and creativity. This paper only discusses the third option.7 
The obscurantist perspective actually leads to a paradox of (in-)explica- 
bility (cf. Kronfeldner 2009: 582); if an allegedly creative act is a true crea- 
tive act, it is not explainable, and if it is naturalistically explainable, then it 
is not a true creative act. Either it is inexplicable, or what we explained is 
not creative. This paradox of (in-)explicability is established by pure stipu- 
lation, by equating creativity with metaphysical freedom. The problem is 
that this conceptual equation runs into a dilemma: 
  If naturalism is correct (humans with all their actions are part of 
‘Nature’ and thus we can in principle explain what they do), then 
nobody is creative. The problem with this horn of the dilemma is that it is 
too narrow. After all, there seems to be agreement that there are at least 
some truly creative people. 
 
Yet, this horn of the dilemma would not be chosen by the obscurantist 
anyway, since the obscurantist reasoning is implicitly driven by anti-natu- 
ralist leanings. 
 
      However, if naturalism is wrong (as the obscurantist would assume), 
then unfortunately, everybody is creative. Why? Since the view equates 
creativity with metaphysical freedom. But metaphysical freedom – as 
usually conceived – holds either for all humans (with their mind, etc.) 
or for none. Thus, everybody is creative and in the same sense. The 
problem with this horn, evidently, is that it is too broad. It is too broad 
especially for those who believe in creativity as being exceptional- 
ist (different in kind). It is still a problem for those who believe in a 
more gradual picture; the exceptionalist usually has only a few people 
exhibiting the extraordinary ‘gift’. Finally, even the non-exceptionalist 
assumes that some people are more and some are less creative. But it 
is not standard to assume that metaphysically some people are more and 
some people are less free, even if each human might be practically more 
or less free (to think or do this or that). 
 
In the following, I will show that metaphysical freedom is neither sufficient 
nor necessary for creativity. What is sufficient and necessary rather is a psy- 
chological freedom – a kind of freedom that is compatible with naturalism 
and thus in principle explainable. 
 
       Metaphysical freedom is not sufficient. If it were sufficient, then, as men- 
tioned above, everybody or every allegedly ‘free’ act would count as 
creative, even a person voting for party XYZ in an election. It 
would be quite a stretch to call an act like this – even if we assume 
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it to be metaphysically free – creative. It has neither originality nor 
spontaneity in the relevant sense. 
       
      Metaphysical freedom is not necessary. To establish originality and sponta- 
neity, all that is required is an independence from very specific causal 
factors (creative freedom) and not from causal determination as such 
(metaphysical freedom). 
 
The kind of freedom that is necessary and sufficient is creative freedom, the 
combination of the two core aspects of creativity: 
 
     (a) Originality: partial independence from the causal influence of an 
original (direct or via a model) (opposition: learning, copying). 
     (b) Spontaneity: partial independence from the causal influence of 
previously acquired knowledge (opposition: routine, method). 
 
A well-known example from the annals of the history of science is that of 
Friedrich A. Kekulé, which illustrates the difference between creative free- 
dom (partial independence from certain causal influences) and metaphysi- 
cal freedom. Kekulé searched for the molecular structure of the benzene 
molecule and he reported that he fell asleep and had the following dream: 
 
I turned my chair to the fire and dozed […] Again the atoms were gam- 
bolling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly in the 
background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by repeated visions of 
this kind, could now distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformation; 
long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and twisting in 
snake-like motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized 
hold of its own tail, and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if 
by a flash of lightning I awoke.8 
 
If the report is correct, then this dream was Kekulé’s moment of insight.9 
What kind of independence do we encounter in this paradigmatic example 
of an original and spontaneous insight? There is no evidence for or against 
metaphysical freedom, but there is evidence that Kekulé was skilled in 
visual imagination, which might have been influenced by the fact that he 
studied architecture before he became a chemist. In addition, Kekulé 
might have been subject to some visual impacts (e.g., visiting a zoo, 
visiting a dance performance) that influenced him when he visualized 
benzene in the way he reports. Yet, these causal influences do not make 
him less creative, i.e., they do not take away originality and spontaneity. 
How come? Because these influences have nothing to do with the benzene molecule. 
As I said elsewhere (2009: 585–587), even though his idea does not 
come out of  nothing, his visual imagination is very likely influenced by 
factors that come from outside the context. Kekulé’s previous knowledge 
and his goal-orientedness to find a solution to the problem of the 
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structure of the benzene molecule made it likely that he would find the 
solution, but the previous knowledge and the goal-orientation were not 
sufficient for him to find it. He needed some inspiration from out of context 
– out of nothing not metaphysically, but rather relative to the problem-
space he was dealing with. 
Such a relativized ‘out of nothing’ can account for the psychological 
originality and spontaneity involved. Given standard philosophical termi- 
nology, the causal influences that were involved in the emergence of his 
idea about benzene as forming a ring are so-called coincidental influences. 
Coincidences account for surprise and practical unpredictability, but they 
do not conflict with determinism. In a naturalistic account of creativity, 
coincidences replace metaphysical freedom. 
 
 
Creativity as excluding certain kinds of explanations 
 
A naturalistic account – by definition – cannot claim that a phenom- 
enon is in principle inexplicable. Yet, it can – via respective conceptual 
assumptions about the respective phenomenon – exclude certain kinds of 
explanation. If we take into account the instances of partial independence 
that originality and spontaneity require, this entails that explanations that 
reduce creativity to the influence of already acquired knowledge must fail. 
By necessity (i.e., by conceptual assumption), creativity requires to tran- 
scend any already acquired knowledge. 
This conceptual exclusion of certain kinds of explanation also stands behind 
claims that are part of a tradition of explaining creativity which has been called 
‘Darwinian,’ since it refers to a process of ‘blind variation’ and consequent 
selection. Novelty in culture is understood as produced in an analogous man- 
ner, as novelty in nature is produced by a proverbial ‘blind watchmaker,’ pro- 
ducing lots of errors and ‘waste,’ tinkering with what is contingently at hand 
rather than designing things from scratch.10  The novelty produced then gets 
evaluated at various levels; the individual as well as the social one. 
Creativity in such a picture is nothing but variation and selection, where 
chance favours the prepared mind. The Darwinian model of naturalizing 
creativity was most famously defended by Donald Campbell. He wrote, 
for instance: 
 
Real gains must have been the products of explorations going beyond the 
limits of foresight or prescience, and in this sense blind. (Campbell 1960: 92; 
emphasis added) 
[I]n going beyond what is already known, one cannot but go blindly. If one 
can go wisely, this indicates already achieved wisdom of some general sort. 
(Campbell [1974] 1987b: 57) 
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This and similar remarks by others (e.g., Popper) amount to a conceptual 
argument about creativity; real gains must have been “blind” by definition. 
Gaut (this volume) calls it the “Ignorance Principle”. If creativity is defined 
as going beyond what is already known, that is, defined as bringing about 
something new (‘real gains’), then creativity excludes foresight, since fore- 
sight is defined as knowing something already. There must be some igno- 
rance for there to be creativity. As Plato already stressed in his paradox of 
search in the Meno: if we know something, we cannot look for it, since we 
know it already; if we, however, do not know it, we cannot even look for 
it, since we do not know what we are looking for. That is why we cannot 
bring about something new by will and foresight. And that is why we make 
errors. A perfect God-like creator can thus not be creative, since a perfect 
being would have foresight and could thus prevent errors before making 
them. But for a God-like creator, there is no need to be creative in the 
narrow sense; this creator knows everything already – a truly superior but 
uncreative being. 
Such a conceptual argument assumes a certain concept of  ‘blind’ as 
opposed to foresight, which is not the same as saying that we produce 
things at random or in an undirected manner. Neither creative ideas, nor 
biological mutations are produced randomly (in the sense that they are 
equally likely). Yet, biological mutations are produced in an undirected man- 
ner. Undirected variation can be defined in the following way: the occur- 
rence of a variant X* is undirected, if and only if the occurrence of X* 
is not made more likely through the environment to which the organism 
with X has to adapt. If the occurrence is made more likely through the 
environment, there is a coupling between originating and selecting factors. 
For instance, if the occurrence of a longer neck (X*) in a giraffe is made 
more likely through the environment (e.g., tall trees) to which the neck (X) 
of the giraffe has to adapt, then the occurrence of the longer neck (X*) is 
directed.11 
While genetic variation is still believed to be only produced in an undi- 
rected manner, ideas are normally conceived as being produced in a 
directed one. In human cognition, already acquired knowledge usually 
influences not only the production of new ideas but also the selection 
thereof. So, selective factors are often simultaneously producing ones, 
which makes the production of the ideas guided (i.e., directed in the above- 
defined sense). Thus, if  ‘blind’ means ‘undirected’, then the Darwinian 
model is wrong in explaining creativity.12 
There is however a third meaning of ‘blind’ that saves the analogy 
between how novelty in nature and how novelty in culture is produced; 
in both cases, there is no guarantee that the novelty that is produced is ade- 
quate. The novelty is unjustified by origin. Even though the creative system 
works with previously acquired knowledge, it works without foresight and 
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can thus not prevent errors. Humans clearly produce inadequate ideas. We 
make errors and are indeed quite often ‘blind’ in that sense. 
If ‘blind’ only means ‘error-prone’, then the Darwinian model is evi- 
dently correct. However, it does not explain creativity, either. It just reformu- 
lates what is part of the phenomenon in an abstract manner, namely that 
originality and spontaneity are involved. It excludes certain kinds of expla- 
nation (via learning, method and perfect foresight), but it does not itself 
give an explanation of how creative ideas are produced. It just repeats 
the description and is explanatorily trivial. Claiming that the Darwinian 
model (if interpreted as claiming that ideas are produced based on a 
process of variation and selection) explains creativity would be analogous 
to claiming that an alleged virtus dormitiva of opium explains why opium 
makes you sleep. The account just repeats what is already assumed.13 
Yet, this is not the end of the story of explaining creativity with ref- 
erence to a Darwinian ‘blind variation’ principle. ‘Blind’ can be taken to 
mean more than that there are errors involved. It can be taken to refer to 
an unconscious, special cognitive process – a hidden chaos – that happens 
as part of a guided, i.e., directed production of novelty. 
 
 
Creativity as practically inaccessible 
 
The assumption of a hidden chaos beneath the apparent guidedness of 
creative problem-solving has been defended by Dean K. Simonton (1988, 
1995).14  The claim is that there is a special chance-configuration process, 
a special cognitive process that is in and of itself practically inexplicable, 
since it is unconscious, hard to access and built on randomness (or at least 
undirectedness). If it could be shown that there is such a cognitive process, 
then the Darwinian model would gain some explanatory power, since it 
would point to an actual causal cognitive process that explains the occur- 
rence of creativity. 
The problem with this way out for the Darwinian account is that 
the chance-configuration process is made so ‘hidden’ that it becomes 
hard to assess the claim that it exists. It reaches its explanatory power 
only at the price of extreme unobservability and thus evidential inac- 
cessibility. This entails that the claim about the actual cognitive process 
which accounts for the phenomenology of creativity is hard to test. 
In addition, there is evidence from cognitive studies, producing the 
most direct (even though still indirect) evidence on unconscious cog- 
nitive processes, which seems not to speak in favour of Simonton’s 
chance-configuration hypothesis.15 However, since the empirical evi- 
dence might well change, the philosophical point that can be derived 
from this is quite limited but decisive nonetheless; as long as there is 
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no conclusive evidence from cognitive science about the hidden chaos, 
the Darwinian model has not succeeded in providing any convincing 
explanatory information on creativity. 
To sum up, the core issue about the Darwinian model applied to the 
cognitive level is: despite its naturalistic orientation, it assumes a special, 
extraordinary cognitive process. In addition, this is a cognitive process 
hypothesized especially for creativity, which is in danger of being ad hoc. 
The account gains explanatory power, but only at the price of keeping 
the cognitive process ‘hidden’ and ‘special’, which amounts to practical 
inexplicability. 
If we take the previous section and this one together, the argument 
is that the Darwinian model fails to explain creativity either because it 
confuses description with explanation (if blind means error-prone), or 
because it falls victim to left-overs from the long philosophical tradition 
of regarding creativity as inexplicable and extraordinary. It postulates an 
extra creative cognitive process that is so hidden that it is practically inac- 
cessible as well as inexplicable. 
Finally, it is unlikely that the model supports a view where creativity is a 
matter of more or less. Creativity is still conceived as extraordinary – even 
though now predominantly at the level of kinds of cognitive processes 
rather than at the level of kinds of people. The model does not preclude 
that individuals exhibit the hidden cognitive process more or less. After 
all, Campbell (and later Dennett and others) applied their model even to 
all living creatures. There is a cascade of variation-and-selection processes 
culminating in humans, but despite this graduality, the model postulates a 
special kind of cognitive process accounting for novelty – in nature, mind 
or culture. There is thus a smack of extraordinariness left – and still no 
explanation reached. 
 
 
The ordinary process view: an alternative? 
 
In the meantime, some theorists in creativity research have given up 
searching for an extraordinary process underlying creativity (or insight, as 
psychologists prefer to call the core of creativity in the narrow sense dis- 
cussed here). They point towards ordinary cognitive processes. According 
to this ordinary-process view, creativity can be demystified as ordinary cogni- 
tion. Some of these ordinary processes might well be unconscious and 
more specific for problems that show the characteristic spontaneous ‘Aha’ 
experience, but others are not. For instance, the representational-change 
theory, defended by Knoblich et al. (1999, 2001), focuses on uncon- 
scious processes of changing the representation of a problem, while the 
progress-monitoring theory, defended e.g., MacGregor et al. (2001), 
stresses conscious heuristics that monitor progress in problem-solving.16 
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In addition, the assumption is sometimes that the many cognitive processes 
involved operate – in the case of insight – at their highest efficiency and in 
a complex manner. The ordinary processes assumed to make up creativ- 
ity are, for instance perception, visual imagery, diverse cognitive heuristics 
such as distortion, repetition, omission and mixing parts of concepts and 
images, constraint relaxation, chunk decomposition, associational link- 
age, conceptual combination, analogical reasoning, abstraction, use of 
metaphors, conceptual expansion, memory retrieval, spreading activation, 
opportunistic assimilation and so on. 
In a nutshell, the ordinary-process view claims that to explain creativ- 
ity one does not require a special process of chance-configuration. The 
more radical ordinary-process view perspectives even hold that there is no 
particular mental operation that only creative people and nobody else can per- 
form. As Bowden et al. (2005: 323) write: “there are multiple ways in which 
an insight can be produced”. There will then be evidence for all of the 
diverse cognitive processes discussed as part of the overarching ordinary- 
process view without one cognitive process ‘being the winner that takes it 
all.’17  In addition, these multiple cognitive processes can interact in com- 
plex but highly efficient ways, and at the moment of insight at quite a high 
speed, and some of them (e.g., perception) on auto-pilot (i.e., not con- 
sciously monitored). These aspects – multiplicity, speed, complexity, auto- 
pilot – and not a hidden unconscious chaos explain why creative agents act 
spontaneously, and with that they explain why these creative agents often 
cannot report or reconstruct how they came up with their ideas and why it 
is so hard to predict the occurrence of creativity. 
 
[C]reative thought is not a simple, uniform process. Instead, multiple pro- 
cesses, strategies, and mental operations may be involved, applied by differ- 
ent people, in different ways, at different points in a creative effort. 
(Mumford 1999: 344) 
What distinguishes the highly creative individual from the only modestly 
creative one is the confluence of multiple factors, rather than extremely high 
levels of any particular factor or even the possession of a distinctive trait. 
(Sternberg and Sternberg 2016: 434)18 
 
What is extraordinary about creativity is multiple and gradual: multiplicity, 
speed, complexity and the degree of auto-piloting of the ordinary cogni- 
tive processes involved vary depending on the amount of training and 
skill developed. There is no one talent or skill. There is only a network of 
trained abilities.19 
This ordinary-process view still regards creativity to be practically hard 
to access. After all, complexity is often just another word for ‘hard to access.’ 
Nonetheless, the ordinary-process view is an important step forward 
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towards explaining creativity. The view does not start with the assumption 
that there is a special cognitive process involved. It is thus remotest from 
the philosophical tradition with respect to exceptionalist assumptions, 
since not only does it get rid of the attitude that only few of us can be 
crea- tive, but it also discards the residuals of the paradigm, namely that 
there is something extraordinary about creativity, in the person or in the 
cognitive processes involved. 
Why is this good? If we are not biased towards the exceptionalist con- 
cept, parsimony tells us to try first to go with ordinary processes only. 
To put it into an evolutionary argument: why should a special cognitive 
process for creativity evolve if combining and speeding up normal cogni- 
tive processes would do it? For the purpose of explanation, the ordinary 
process view is less laden with philosophical background assumptions and 
there is at least direct evidence that these processes exist, even though it is 
still hard to explain how – in their complex interaction and speed – they 
can account for actual occurrences of creativity. 
 
 
Summary on the prospects of explaining creativity 
 
Creativity is hard to explain, like the weather. As science has made progress 
with the latter, it will make progress with the former as well. Complexity is 
a practical, transient obstacle, not an in-principle one. It is also likely, 
given the ordinary-process view, that creativity is not an ability that only 
few of us have. This holds despite differences in degree with respect to 
the ‘outstanding’ results produced by specific individuals. Not everyone 
is a creative storm that changes the intellectual landscape. Yet, as we 
learned from the early Greek philosophers who started to emancipate 
philosophy from religion, even a storm operates on natural principles; 
these are the same principles that account for a mild, refreshing wind on a 
normal day. No exceptionalities or mysteries are needed to account for 
either of them. The same holds for creativity. No special process, no 
exceptionalities are needed to explain any of its occurrences, be it wild 
or mild. 
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Notes 
 
1 This paper integrates arguments that were developed in detail in Kronfeldner (2009, 2010, 2011). In 
this paper, the focus is on reviewing the situation on whether or not creativity is explainable and if so, in 
which sense it is. 
2 See Gaut (2009) for more details on this contrast and on how to distinguish routine learning (fol- 
lowing algorithms) from skill (which includes rules of thumb). Only routine, a ‘mechanical’ process is 
incompatible with creativity. 
3 See Kronfeldner (2009: 580–581) for more details. 
4 I take the distinction between true and pseudo-serendipity from Roberts (1989); see Kronfeldner 
(2011: 38–41) for details and examples. Gaut (2009) also stresses that creativity does not exclude goal-
orientedness. I agree. 
5 A complete in-depth history of theorizing about creativity is, to the best of my knowledge, not yet 
available. See, however, for instance: Blumenberg (1957) and Mahrenholz (2010), who covered many 
important aspects from ‘Plato to Nato’. The concept of genius has gotten some in-depth coverage, e.g., 
in the two volumes of Schmidt (1985) for the period between the years 1750–1945, or in the analysis of 
the Vienna circle member Edgar Zilsel (1918, 1926). 
6 This also signals that creativity happens in the minds of people, but it is not reducible to that level of 
analysis. It is as much social as it is individual. For the social level, see Amabile (1996) or Wheeler (this 
volume). 
7 Dealing with non-naturalistic kinds of explanation would lead us too far away, into the muddy 
waters of the philosophy of explanation, which already struggles to include non-causal naturalis- tic 
explanations in a common frame with causal explanation (see Reutlinger, forthcoming). With respect 
to the second option, I assume, without having the space to argue for it here, that reduc- ing creativity 
to in-deterministic causation does not capture the core aspects of originality and spontaneity. 
8 For background on his case and the quotation, see Findlay (1968: 34–41, 39). 
9 Historians have accumulated some evidence that the report is not correct. See Wotiz and Rudofsky (1984) 
as well as Rudofsky and Wotiz (1988). Rudofsky and Wotiz criticize using the example as evidence for 
insight in historical and psychological scholarship. I agree with their criticism, but I still think that we 
can treat the case as an illustrative example, as a hypothetical paradigmatic example of what we mean 
when we talk about creativity. It is a usage common in conceptual analysis (see also note 13 below) 
that certainly does not allow to explain creativity via the example, or to take the example as evidence 
for one or another scientific theory of creativity. 
10 There are similar models of trials and error prior to or independent of the Darwinian model. In the 
mid-nineteenth century, Alexander Bain (1855) formulated a theory of learning based on trial- and-
error, a principle that was a mathematical tool, the so-called “Rule of False” before it became 
incorporated as a theoretical principle in psychology and evolutionary thinking. See Cowles (2015) on 
that history. Later, Poincaré (1908), a famous mathematician, tried to naturalize creativity by 
comparing it to a random dance of gas molecules of which some match the ‘hooks’ of the human 
mind and become conscious. See Boden (this volume) for further aspects of comparing creativity in 
nature with creativity in minds. 
11 See Kronfeldner (2010, 2011: 17–22) for a detailed analysis of the different options to interpret 
‘blind’ in claims about creativity, offering a formal analysis of undirectedness in the biological sense. 
Simonton (2013) builds on this and offers an even more formal reconstruction of ‘blind’ along the lines 
of the above definition of blind as undirectedness, stressing that creativity and sightedness are 
mathematically inversely related and that directedness (sightedness) comes in degrees. This gives me 
the chance to comment on his interpretation of my account, since it involves a misinterpreta- tion: I 
claimed that undirectedness cannot have degrees, while directness comes in degrees. “[D] irectedness is 
a matter of degree, whereas undirectedness is simply the absence or negation of any directendess 
and thus (logically) not a matter of degree.” (Kronfeldner 2010: 196) I went on distinguishing between 
complete coupling and partial coupling (i.e., complete and partial directed- ness). Simonton interpreted 
me as saying that neither undirectedness nor directedness can come in degrees. 
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12 For details, see Kronfeldner (2010, 2011: 53–74). Even true serendipity is guided, i.e., directed in 
the sense of cognitive coupling of producing and selecting factors (ibid. 56–58). 
13 See Kronfeldner (2011: 10–12) for details on the concept of explanatory triviality assumed here. It 
contrasts with heuristic triviality. In brief: heuristic triviality is not saying anything new; explana- tory 
triviality is not saying anything explanatory. Thus, adding something to the description of a 
phenomenon, in a way that enters any serious conceptual analysis, is certainly not heuristically 
trivial, but it might well be explanatorily trivial, depending on the kind of information added. Only 
some information about a phenomenon is explanatory. The claim made here is thus compatible with 
Berys Gaut’s remarks about spontaneity, analyticity and triviality (this volume, section on 
spontaneity, footnote). Whether or not a formal, mathematical reconstruction of the concept of 
creativity adds empirical, descriptive content, as Simonton (2013: 262) assumes, is another matter that I 
cannot discuss here. Yet, in any case, it does not explain creativity in the causal sense assumed in the 
criterion of explanatory triviality. 
14 Simonton has since published further works and not all of them rely on the claim of a special 
cognitive process. Stein and Lipton (1989: 39f) also defend such compatibility and use the term 
“hidden chaos”, but in a different sense than Simonton on whom I will concentrate here. For a 
critique of Stein and Lipton, see Kronfeldner (2010, 2011: 61–63). 
15 See Kronfeldner (2011: 65–71) for a review of the indirect evidence up to a certain point. 
16 For a comparison between the two see also: Öllinger et al. (2013). Bowden et al. (2005: 322), in 
reviewing the differences between representational-change theory and progress-monitoring theory, call 
the first the “special process” view and the second the “business as usual” view. The difference 
between his terminology and mine is this: the representational-change theory is also an ordinary-
process view in my terminology, even though it is a “special process“ view in theirs, referring to a 
process that is of special importance to understanding certain aspects of insight and thus creativity, but 
otherwise perfectly ordinary and accessible by the means of cognitive science. 
17 Öllinger et al (2013) take such an integrative stance, for instance. They treat representational- 
change theory and progress-monitoring theory as addressing different aspects of insight. 
18 See also: Weisberg (1993), Ward et al. (1999: 190–191) and Boden (2004: 260ff). The accounts of 
these authors certainly differ, but not in ways that matter for the point under discussion here. 
19 With the term ‘ability’ I want to stay neutral with respect to the distinction between creativity as a dis- 
position or capacity (Gaut, this volume). An ability, in my terminology, can be a disposition or a capacity in 
Gaut’s terminology. 
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